

**אמר רבא – said to him; ‘but it is a discredited testimony’!**

### Overview

Testimony of witnesses can be disqualified in the following two ways:

A. הכחשה – a contradictory testimony. If two groups of עדים contradict each other as to the veracity of an incident; where one group claims that it took place and the other denies that it took place, neither testimony is accepted, and their testimony is disqualified.

The גמרא will shortly cite a dispute between רב הונא and רב חסדא whether these two groups of עדים may testify in the future, or that they are disqualified to testify in future cases as well for they are considered (possible) liars (מספק).

B. הזמה – a refuted testimony. If the second group of עדים testifies that the first group of עדים could not have possibly seen the incident at the purported time and place (regardless of whether the incident took place or not); for at that same time the first group of עדים were in fact together with the second group at a different location. In this case of הזמה, the second group is believed and the first group is refuted, and become disqualified to be עדים in the future as well.

There is a dispute between רבא and אביי as to when this disqualification becomes effective. אביי maintains that the refuted (זוממין) עדים, become disqualified retroactively from the time of their testimony. Any testimony given by the עדים זוממין from their initial testimony (for which they were subsequently refuted) and onward, is voided. רבא, however maintains that they become פסול only from the time of their refutation by the עדים המזימים, and onward<sup>1</sup>. Any testimony given prior to their הזמה is valid.

The case at hand: ראובן and שמעון were disputing the ownership of a property, each one claiming that he inherited it from his parents. ראובן had עדים that it once belonged to his father and in addition that ראובן made a חזקה in this property. שמעון only had עדים that he made a חזקה (contradicting the עדים of ראובן who claimed that ראובן made the חזקה). רב נחמן ruled that the two contradictory עדות cancel out, leaving ראובן with ownership on

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<sup>1</sup> There are two explanations in the גמרא (ב"ק) why רבא maintains his (questionable) position (for seemingly since these עדים certainly lied at the time of their testimony, they should become נפסל from that time onward). One is that since the entire idea of עד זומם (חידוש) is a novel concept (for why should we believe the second group more than the first group); therefore we limit the חידוש as much as possible (אין לך בו אלא למפרע), and the power of the עדים המזימים to disqualify the עד זומם is limited to the moment of הזמה and onward. The second explanation is that if we were to פסל them למפרע, then there would be losses (פסידא) to all those who used these עדים (in between the עדות and הזמה), for their documents of loans and purchases would be voided. See later footnote # 12.

account of his אבהתא רבא. עדי אבהתא רבא disagreed and argued that these עדים of ראובן were already disqualified and are completely discredited. תוספות will be discussing רבא's view.

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תוספות has a difficulty:

**It is incomprehensible! Why is the testimony concerning parental ownership (עדות אבהתא) considered as –**

**a contradicted testimony?** We can perhaps salvage the part of the testimony where no contradictory testimony was provided; the עדות אבהתא תוספות goes on to explain:

**For רבא maintains in פרק מרובה –** והא רבא אית ליה במרובה (בבא קמא דף עב,ב ושם דיבור המתחיל רבא) - פרק מרובה

**– פרק זה בורר and in בורר –** ובפרק זה בורר (סנהדרין דף כז,א ושם דיבור המתחיל רבא)

**that a refuted witness becomes disqualified from the time of refutation and onwards,** but he is not פסול retroactively from the time of his testimony. The testimony that the עד gave prior to the actual הזמה (concerning other issues [not related to the הזמה]) is valid testimony. It would seem logical that this ruling concerning עד זומם, עד זומם, should apply to עד זומם as well<sup>2</sup>. The disqualification of their testimony is not retroactive from the time of their testimony, but rather from the time they were actually contradicted and onwards<sup>3</sup>. תוספות concludes the question:

**– and we should therefore assume that –** ואית לן למימר

**concerning their testimony regarding consumption (חזקה) –אאכילתה**

**where they were contradicted** by the other group of עדים who claimed that the other party made the חזקה,

**they are indeed discredited** and cannot be believed; that testimony is disqualified. However –

**concerning their testimony regarding parental ownership –** אאבהתא

**where they were not contradicted;** the other עדים said nothing concerning parental ownership of the property –

**they are not contradicted;** and that testimony should not be disqualified. We should accept their testimony that it belonged to his parents.

If we would maintain, that למפרע הוא נפסל, then their testimony would retroactively be invalid from the moment they stated it. At the time of their testimony they stated אבהתא and אכילתה together; it was one testimony. Therefore, since part of their testimony is obviously disqualified (at the time of their testimony), for it was contradicted; then anything else that they testified at that time (תוך כדי דיבור) is included in this disqualification. [There is a rule; a testimony that is partially nullified becomes completely nullified.]

<sup>2</sup> In fact one may argue that the הכחשה of פסול is weaker than the הזמה of פסול. If by הזמה the פסול is only מכאן ולהבא, then certainly by הכחשה the disqualification of their עדות should only be מכאן ולהבא.

<sup>3</sup> By הכחשה the terms מכאן ולהבא or נפסל is referring to the פסול of the עד himself. By הזמה, however (according to רב הונא), these terms refer to the disqualification of the עדות, not to the עדים at all.

If we maintain, however, מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, it would mean that after בי"ד heard all aspects of the case and found the עדים to be contradictory, their testimony becomes void from that moment on, only.<sup>4</sup> At the time of their testimony, however, it should be considered a valid testimony.<sup>5</sup> It is just that we cannot subsequently act on (part of) their testimony since it is contradicted by the other עדים<sup>6</sup> and must be disqualified. However this should apply only to the testimony that is subsequently being contradicted. Any other testimony that they previously testified remains valid, since it was not contradicted.<sup>7</sup>

עדות will now prove that we can separate the two aspects of their testimony; the עדות אכילתה and אבהתא. We can accept one even when we discard the other.

**פרק states in גמרא – For this is what the אמר במרובה (בבא קמא דף עג,א ושם) מרובה** concerning עדים who testified that an individual stole and slaughtered an animal, which would require the thief to pay four/five times the amount that he stole (תשלומי ד' – וה) –

**that if these עדים were refuted (היום) concerning the slaughtering,** however –

**they were not הוזהר concerning the theft.** That testimony was not refuted by the המזימים עדים.

**even though the המוזמים testified consecutively** <sup>8</sup> **תוך כדי דיבור** – אף על גב דתוך כדי דיבור העידו –

**on the robbery and the slaughtering;** both testimonies were offered consecutively without interruption. This would seemingly make it into one testimony. Nevertheless the גמרא there maintains that –

**according to רבא, since it is from that time–**

**that the were הוזהר;** it is only from then – דקא מיתזמי

**פסול**, and not from any time before, therefore – **that they become**

**concerning the slaughtering which they were מוזהר –**

**they were indeed מוזהר;** however –

**concerning the robbery for which they were not מוזהר –**

<sup>4</sup> It would therefore make no difference which group of עדים testified first, or the order of their individual testimony, whether they said אבהתא first or אכילתה first. In all instances they become an עדות מוכחשת only after all the testimony is presented, accepted and ruled upon by בי"ד.

<sup>5</sup> This should be true even according to רב חסדא who maintains that these עדים become פסול for future עדות. It is only after the הכחשה that they become פסולים עדים but not at the time of their עדות (see תוספות second question further on, and footnote # 14).

<sup>6</sup> According to רב חסדא this will cause them to be disqualified as עדים in the future as well (on account that they are עדי שקר). However neither they nor their testimony are disqualified retroactively.

<sup>7</sup> If we maintain מכאן ולהבא then at the time of the testimony there was no contradictory testimony, they were עדים כשרים; therefore there is no ruling of בטלה כולה. See סוכ"ד אות מט וכו'.

<sup>8</sup> תוך כדי דיבור – means the time that it takes to say the words 'שלום עליך רבי'. If the interruption between statements was less than that time, it is considered תוך כדי דיבור; as one statement.

**עדים זוממין they are not considered – לא איתזום** regarding the robbery<sup>9</sup>. This concludes the quote from the גמרא. We may derive from that גמרא, that it is possible to separate the two aspects of their testimony even though they were offered simultaneously. The עדות of גניבה remains a valid עדות even though it was said together with עדות טביחה, which was subsequently הוזם. The same should hold true here. The עדות of אבהתא should remain valid, even though it was said together with the עדות אכילתה which was subsequently הוכחש. Why then does רבא, who maintains נפסל הוא מכאן ולהבא, argue on רב נחמן and claim that it is an עדות מוכחשת?

תוספות offers a qualified explanation:

**And according to the opinion [there] that the reason that רבא maintains נפסל הוא מכאן ולהבא is –**

**because the law of עד זומם is a novelty<sup>12</sup> – משום דעד זומם חידוש [הוא]<sup>11</sup> and you cannot implement this חידוש, only from the time when this חידוש takes place and onwards; i.e. from the time of the הזמה. According to this opinion –**

**it is understood. ניהא – it is understood.** There is no question. תוספות initially assumed that since by הזמה it is נפסל הוא מכאן ולהבא, therefore by הכחשה it is also נפסל הוא מכאן ולהבא; therefore we had the question. However we can say that only by הזמה it is נפסל הוא מכאן ולהבא, as the reason indicates since it is a חידוש. However by הכחשה where there is no חידוש – we do not believe any group of עדים more than the other; in fact we believe neither group, then we follow the logical conclusion that the עדות is בטל למפרע; at the time of the testimony. It is at that point when they (may) have lied. If the testimony is בטל למפרע, then it is understood that we cannot believe the עדות אבהתא either, since it is part of a disqualified testimony.

**however according to the opinion that explains the reason רבא maintains נפסל הוא מכאן ולהבא is not because חידוש הוא, but rather –**

**on account of the purchasers' loss. משום פסידא דלקוחות**. If we were to disqualify them retroactively, then all those buyers who used these עדים on their מקה שטרי (with no way of knowing that these עדים will subsequently be disqualified retroactively), will suffer irreparable loss. Their שטרות will be voided. Therefore the law instituted that they become נפסל only מכאן ולהבא. According to this opinion there is no difference between הכחשה and הזמה, if we protect the consumer in the case of הזמה the same protection is required in the case of הכחשה. Therefore–

**here too by הכחשה, we should believe the עדים since it is מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל.**

<sup>9</sup> They are not obligated to pay the קנס of זומם כאשר concerning the גניבה only for the טביחה. The גנב has to pay the תשלומי כפל based on their testimony.

<sup>10</sup> See הגהות הב"ח.

<sup>11</sup> See previous הגהות הב"ח.

<sup>12</sup> See footnote # 1.

<sup>13</sup> See הגהות הב"ח אות כ.

anticipates a possible answer and rejects it. Seemingly one may argue that we maintain מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל when we entertain a פסידיא דלקוחות. However in our case, when both groups of עדים came to בי"ד together; even if we would rule that למפרע הוא נפסל, there will be no פסידיא דלקוחות. These עדים did not sign on any documents between their הגדה and הכחשה. Therefore since there is no realistic פסידיא דלקוחות, even רבא admits that תוספות rejects this idea:

**and even in a case where there is no loss to the consumers;** as in our case, where they did not sign on any שטר between the הגדה and the הכחשה, nevertheless –

**– they are not disqualified retroactively –**

**– אפילו להביא לישנא – even according to that opinion;** which maintains that the reason הוא נפסל is (only) because of פסידיא דלקוחות. An עד is always נפסל only פסידיא דלקוחות in that instance.

will now prove that (even) according to the לשון that מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, is on account of פסידיא דלקוחות, nevertheless they will always maintain that מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל even if there is no פסידיא דלקוחות in a specific case.

**– since the גמרא queries there;** in פרק מרובה –

**what difference is there between this opinion (פסידיא דלקוחות) and the other opinion (חידוש הוא) –**

**– and the גמרא does not state that there is a difference between them –**

**פסידיא דלקוחות – in a case where there is no פסידיא דלקוחות.** The גמרא could have answered that in a case where there is no פסידיא דלקוחות there is a difference between the two לשונות. If we maintain the reason is because עד זומם is a חידוש then it makes no difference whether or not there is a פסידיא דלקוחות, in all cases it is מכאן. However if we maintain that the reason is because פסידיא דלקוחות, then only when there is a פסידיא do we say מכאן ולהבא הוא גובה, but when there is no פסידיא, we should maintain that למפרע הוא נפסל. The גמרא however does not make this distinction. That proves that the גמרא maintains that in all instances whether or not there is a פסידיא דלקוחות we maintain that מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל.

In summation: the question remains; according to the לשון that רבא maintains עד זומם מכאן להביא because of פסידיא דלקוחות; the same rule should apply to עדים מוכחשים that the testimony becomes להבא מכאן. Therefore only the contradicted testimony (עדי חזקה) should be disqualified but the uncontested testimony (עדי אבהתא) should remain. Why does רבא claim that it is an עדות מוכחשת?!

has an additional question:

**– and there is another difficulty –**

**– דקאמר בסמוך – for the גמרא will shortly state that –**

**– אליבא דרב חסדא – according to רב חסדא** who maintains that both groups of עדים that were מוכחש cannot testify in the future (for they are [suspected] liars) –

**no one argues;** both רב נחמן and רבא will agree that it is an **עדות מוכחשת** and we cannot accept (even) the testimony of אבהתא. The simple understanding is that since רב חסדא disqualifies both עדים (as opposed to רב הונא who only disqualifies their testimony in this case where they are **עדים מוכחשים**); therefore we cannot accept the testimony of אבהתא since they are **עדים פסולים**.

**it seems from the גמרא that ר"נ** – **משמע דרב נחמן**

**רב חסדא** – **can in no way maintain like רב חסדא** – **לא מצי סבר בשום ענין כרב חסדא**

**עדים false**. It seems from the גמרא **for he considers them false**. עדים. It seems from the גמרא that רב נחמן and רב חסדא are mutually exclusive. If we accept the ruling of ר"ה that the עדים are **פסול**, we cannot accept the ruling of ר"נ, that they are believed concerning the אבהתא. תוספות challenges this assumption:

**and how does the גמרא derive this;** that רב נחמן disagrees with ר"ח – **ומנא ליה**

**perhaps ר"נ maintains** that – **דילמא סבר רב נחמן**

**he becomes disqualified** (according to רב חסדא) – **מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל** only **from now and onwards**; however **למפרע** they are **כשר**. Therefore we can believe their previous testimony of עדות אכילה which was not contested.<sup>14</sup>

תוספות offers an answer on the second question:

**however we can say this**, to explain why the גמרא asserts that ר"נ and ר"ח disagree; we cannot reconcile them by assuming that ר"נ maintains **מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל** – **ומנא ליה**

**because we do not follow the ruling of רבא in this** case of **נפסל** הוא ולהבא הוא נפסל. Rather we follow the opinion of אביי that <sup>15</sup> **למפרע הוא נפסל**. It is assumed that ר"נ also maintains **נפסל**.

The first question, however, remains. We are discussing the opinion of רבא, and it is רבא who maintains **נפסל** הוא ולהבא הוא נפסל, why therefore does he argue that it is an **עדות מוכחשת**?!?

תוספות answers:

**and it appears that we are forced to say that this סוגיא** follows the view – **ונראה דסוגיא דהכא**

**of that opinion** that the reason רבא maintains **מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל** is because **עד זומם** **חידוש**. It is therefore understood, as תוספות mentioned previously, that this applies only to עדים זוממים, which are a **חידוש**. However by **הכחשה** where there is no **חידוש**; in the fact that we follow neither group, then the ruling

<sup>14</sup> This second question (even though it seems similar to the original question) adds an additional dimension. According to the first question תוספות argued that if **מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל** then we should believe the עדות אבהתא (at least) according to רב הונא who maintains **וכו' רבא בפני עצמה ומעידה וכו'**. There is no **פסול** in the עדים; it is just that we cannot follow the testimony of either group since they are **מכחשים** זה"ז. However concerning אבהתא in which there was no **הכחשה** we can follow their testimony. תוספות is now adding that even if they become **עדים פסולים** on account of the **הכחשה**, nevertheless if we maintain **מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל**, that **פסול** is effective in future cases, not in their past testimony. Therefore the עדות אבהתא, which was not **מוכחשת** and was offered before they became **עדים פסולים**, should be accepted (see footnote # 5).

<sup>15</sup> This is represented by the letter 'ע' (עד זומם למפרע הוא נפסל) in the ruling that **הלכתא כאביי ב'ע'ל קג"ם**.

will be that the testimony is disqualified למפרע, and since the two testimonies of אכילה were said simultaneously (תוך כדי דיבור), they are both disqualified. This is what רבא meant when he said עדות מוכחשת היא since it is מוכחשת למפרע.

A question still remains; how will the פסידא דלקוחות לשון of רבא explain our where גמרא argues תוספות? והא עדות מוכחשת היא continues:

**however that opinion**, that the reason רבא maintains פסידא דלקוחות is on account of מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל –

**will maintain that רבא never said such a thing to ר"נ** – סבר דלא אמר ליה רבא לרב נחמן מעולם הכי עדות מוכחשת רבא maintains that we always say (both by הזמה and הכחשה) that the פסול is מכאן ולהבא, therefore the עדות אבהתא which was not מוכחשת will be accepted, as ר"נ ruled.

will now offer a different solution to his question. originally assumed that we can divide the testimony of the עדים into two parts; עדות אכילה and עדות אבהתא. We will maintain that even though עדות אכילה was contradicted, but since עדות אבהתא was not contradicted, it should be accepted. תוספות supported this view from the גמרא in מרובה concerning עדים who were מוזם on their testimony of טביחה but not on the testimony of גניבה. The גמרא there maintains that if we assume that נפסל הוא ולהבא מכאן, then עד זומם מכאן ולהבא הוא נפסל, then אגניבה דלא איתום לא איתום but אטביחה דאיתום איתום. תוספות until now considered the two case identical. The ריב"א will distinguish between the case of טביחה and the case of גניבה ואכילה.

**and the ריב"א is of the opinion –** ולרבי יצחק בר אשר<sup>16</sup> נראה –

**that the case here concerning ואבהתא is not similar** – דלא דמי הק דהכא –

– גניבה וטביחה concerning פרק מרובה in to that case – לההיא דמרובה

**for there stealing and slaughtering are two separate issues.** One can be liable for גניבה even if he is not liable for טביחה –

**and therefore concerning their testimony of גניבה for which there was no הזמה, they are not מוזם.** We believe them that he stole. The liability for stealing exists regardless whether he was טובה afterwards or not. The two חיובים do not depend on each other, therefore we can separate them –

**נפסל להבא** is עד זומם רבא maintains that an – כיון דלהבא הוא נפסל. At the time of their testimony they were כשרים. They testified that someone stole. That testimony on its own makes the גנב liable to pay.

**however here** it is different, since the testimony concerning אבהתא is dependant on the עדות of אכילה as תוספות continues to expound.

**when they were discredited concerning the חזקה;** the other עדים claimed that the other party made the חזקה –

**they are also discredited concerning the parental testimony;** we cannot accept their testimony that it belonged to his parents, even

<sup>16</sup> עיין שם הגדולים להחיד"א בערכו

though no one is contradicting them. The reason is because the two testimonies of אבהתא ואכילה are intertwined –

**for testifying merely that it belonged to his parents without testifying concerning the חזקה, is not sufficient** to grant him the property, even if it indeed belonged once to his parents. If we were to verify that it belonged to the parents of one of the litigants (ראובן) but the other litigant (שמעון) has עדים that he made a חזקה, the ruling would be –

**we would have placed it in the possession of the one –**

**who has witnesses that he made a חזקה.** The reason why שמעון who has עדי חזקה would retain it even though he has no עדים to support his claim that he inherited from his father, is because –

**he is believed to claim that it belonged to my father for one day<sup>17</sup>,** since he has –

**a מיגו, for he could have said** instead –

**I bought it from you** (ראובן). The מיגו establishes that his father owned it at some point (after ראובן's parents). שמעון will retain the property for he has חזקה שיש עמה טענה.

The עדות of אבהתא alone cannot grant the property to ראובן (as just explained). In fact if the עדים testify only that it belonged to ראובן's parents, the property will be awarded to שמעון. The only strength of these עדים is if the claim of אבהתא is combined with the עדות of אכילה. This עדות must be viewed as one whole עדות, not as two separate עדות. Therefore since the עדות of אכילה was מוכחש, it is a הכחשה of the entire עדות including the עדות of אבהתא. It is not similar to עדי גניבה ועדי טביחה.

There still remains, however, a certain difficulty with this answer. The גמרא shortly will initially maintain that the dispute between ר"נ and רבא parallels the dispute between רב and רב חסדא respectively. ר"נ who states that we accept עדות אבהתא agrees with רב that they עדות מוכחשים are still עדים כשרים in the future, while רבא, who states that we cannot accept עדות אבהתא agrees with רב חסדא that the עדים מוכחשים are עדים פסולים in the future. The גמרא, however, retracts this assumption. It is possible that רבא can agree with רב חסדא that these עדים are כשר in future cases – עדות אחרת; it is only in the very same case – לאותה עדות, that רבא maintains that they cannot be believed. This גמרא implies that originally we assumed that עדות אחרת and אותה עדות are equal (otherwise there would be no comparison). If they are believed לעדות אחרת (רב חסדא) they should also be believed לעדות אחרת (רבא); if they are not believed לעדות אחרת (רב חסדא) they would not be believed לעדות אחרת (רבא). רב חסדא poses his question:

**however since as of yet** before the final מסקנא of the גמרא -

**that the גמרא considers** our case of אבהתא ואכילה

**like an עדות אחרת;** that the two testimonies are not entwined, but rather they are separate testimonies, as in the dispute between ר"ה and ר"ה which deals

<sup>17</sup> Even if שמעון originally claimed של אבותי, he can still restate his claim to mean של אבותי שלקחו מאבותיך (in order not to contradict ראובן's עדים who say it belonged to ראובן's parents). שמעון will be believed on the basis of the מיגו, and would be awarded property since he has a חזקה.



with (עדות אחרת) ר"ה (even though it is an אחרת) but must follow the ruling of ר"ה. Therefore, the answer of the ריב"א -

**will not appropriately resolve** the difficulty; for if they are separate testimonies (עדות אחרת), then, since רבא maintains מכאן ולהבא, the עדות of אבהתא is separate from עדות אכילה, and should be accepted. [Or conversely:] The ריב"א distinguishes between the case of גניבה וטביחה which are two independent עדויות, and אכילה which are dependent on each other and considered as one. If this distinction is inherent in understanding רבא, then how could the גמרא assume that אותה עדות and עדות אחרת are the same? We see that רבא distinguishes even באותה עדות whether the two עדויות are entangled or not. Certainly רבא will distinguish between אותה עדות and עדות אחרת.

### Summary

עד זומם חידוש הוא. If this is because רבא maintains נפסל, then by הכחשה it will be נפסל. However if it is because of דלקוחות then by הכחשה it will also be נפסל. מכאן ולהבא נפסל. According to this latter view רבא will agree to ר"נ that the אבהתא is valid (just as the גניבה עדות are valid) since it was not contradicted.

The ריב"א distinguishes between גניבה עדות which is not entwined with טביחה as opposed to אבהתא עדות which is dependant on אכילה, and therefore the entire testimony is פסול even if we maintain the view of דלקוחות.

### Thinking it over

1. Every הזמה is automatically a הכחשה. If we assume the reason of עד זומם, should not the פסול לעדות מספק be עדים זוממים, חידוש הוא testimony?

2. עדות cannot reconcile the ריב"א with the ס"ד of the גמרא that it is an עדות אחרת. Perhaps we can differentiate between the עדות אחרת concerning the מחלוקת of ר"ה ור"ה and the עדות of ריב"א. The מחלוקת between ר"ה ור"ה is whether or not these עדות are (now) considered to be liars. According to ר"ה that they are not liars, and are believed in other (future) testimony, then the עדות אבהתא cannot be considered מוכחשת since the עדות are כשר<sup>18</sup> and אבהתא is an עדות אחרת than the עדות אכילה<sup>19</sup> (even if they are entwined). We must conclude that רבא agrees with ר"ה, that they are liars. Once we assume that they are פסול לעדות, we cannot separate the testimony of אבהתא from אכילה, since אבהתא requires אכילה, making אבהתא ואכילה into one הגדה, and this הגדה is offered by (עכ"פ מכאן ולהבא) עדות פסולים.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> This would be true (in the ס"ד) even if we maintain נפסל, for there is no פסול.

<sup>19</sup> Even the עדות אכילה is not considered 'false'; we just cannot deal with it since it is contradicted.

<sup>20</sup> See אברהם.